

FORM NO. 51-4AA
FEB 1952

25X1

REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Rumania

DATE DISTR. 11 September 1952

SUBJECT Interpretation of Purge of Ana Pauker

NO. OF PAGES 2

DATE OF INFO.

25X1

REFERENCE COPY

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

PLACE
ACQUIRED

DO NOT CIRCULATE

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

- 25X1 1. Ana Pauker's name is now disappearing from the Party indictments against the Rightist deviationists, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu. Malenkov intervened in the Rumanian purge and saved Pauker from confinement to her home in Bucharest by having her moved to the Crimea at the end of June 1952.
- 25X1 2. Ana Pauker's case is not a critical issue in the Communist world. Her importance has always been exaggerated because she was a colorful personality and one of the few outstanding Communist women leaders. The Rumanian Communist Party was only a very small branch of the Communist International. There has never been a Rumanian Communist who would have played any role outside of his own small circle. When Ana Pauker was arrested in 1936, her case was welcomed by the Paris Popular Front organizations to prove the Fascist character of the Rumanian regime and its ties with Hitler. In 1940, the Kremlin got her back as a bonus when it occupied Bessarabia. She then appeared on the staff of the Communist International located in the Moscow suburb, Kuntsevo. During the German offensive, she was evacuated with the rest of the staff to the Bashkirian capital, Ufa, where the Communist International was set up as Scientific Institute No. 205. Her main assignment consisted of writing broadcasts. Stories that Ana was Stalin's special protege are based on insufficient knowledge of the Communist hierarchy. In that hierarchy she belonged in the propaganda department and was never considered as a person of theoretical or political ability, which means that her presence or absence within a Party's leadership did not modify its political weight or color.
3. It is because Ana Pauker aspired to real influence within the Rumanian Central Committee that she was eliminated. She tried to form her own

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

[illegible]

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

- 2 -

group with Luca and Georgescu in the Politburo. Pauker's overambition cannot be linked to the Slansky or Gomulka revolt in the Czech and Polish Parties. The ambitious Luca and Georgescu wished to use Pauker's popularity but were easily broken by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the man with the "iron fist" who organized the Rumanian Communist Party in 1944. Gheorghiu-Dej has an excellent standing with the Moscow Politburo, and his position is not threatened by Malenkov's action to save Ana Pauker. Ana will probably be reeducated to limit her activities to propaganda only and will be returned to the platform in a year or two.

4. The troubles of the Rumanian Communist Party lie elsewhere. In August 1944, the Party was composed of only a few hundred members, most of them in prison including Gheorghiu-Dej. Since 1924, the Party had existed illegally. In this interlude of twenty years, the small organization was filled with minor agents and members of questionable character. In a few weeks after the country's occupation by the Russian Army, the Party membership was inflated to several hundred thousand and in four years to nearly a million. There is no similar growth even in Eastern Europe after 1945. The purge of the last years has eliminated some 180,000 members (about 18 percent) but the Party is still far from the desired cohesion and uniformity. General Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej's statement that the Party is filled with anarchists, with rebels against Party discipline and with nepotists, is certainly correct. Titoism has made no inroad in Rumania not only because that country is so near the Russian border, but because there is no Rumanian nationalism comparable to that of the Serbs and the Croats.
5. The present moment was opportune for the elimination of the Pauker group, because enforced collectivization is increasing the discontent of the peasants to the danger point and scapegoats had to be provided. The currency reform of last January was a most unpopular measure because the peasants had to change their old bills for new ones at a considerable discount. Gheorghiu-Dej's Central Committee has now proclaimed the necessity of terroristic measures against the dissenters and those expelled from the Communist Party. "Conciliation", says Comrade Stalin, "is a concealed form of opportunism."

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY